These are elements of the old configuration, multilateral globalization; the contemporary structure, militarized globalization; and the potential constellation, democratic globalization. He keeps a daily Weblog at www. Are international governmental and nongovernmental organizations weakening the hold of nation-states on global regulatory agendas? If they agree, there will be effective global governance. Insights from public policy approaches from the first two ages could also inform the political economy of public policy. The use of the Internet by terrorist networks to communicate with one another has raised the question of how governments can effectively patrol cyberspace without choking off e-commerce. Finally, the paper identifies characteristics of a viable business model in the music industry and offers lessons for other digital content industries.
Moreover, even where states increase regulations, firms attempt to challenge these developments by claiming that they undermine global competitiveness Braithwaite and Drahos 2000;Murphy 2004. At the same time, my definition is more inclusive than those who use deterritorialization as the primary organizational construct to characterize globalization. Global Internet governance — the design and administration of Internet technology and related policymaking — is among the domains where China and Russia have asserted their national brands. The book All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes Online is your world window, the source of knowledge for anyone who reads it, adds insight. Critically, however, lobbying success is also related to the nature of that position, whether supporting the proposal or whether in favor of strengthening or weakening regulatory stringency. An implicit assumption of most policy analysts and some academics is that globalization leads to a convergence of traditionally national policies governing environmental regulation, consumer health and safety, the regulation of labor, and the ability to tax capital.
While States and multilateral organisations play a central part in devising rules, regulation as a social practice extends beyond their role. The third—which is starting to take shape—is the age of the political economy of public policy, drawing on models and methods that have been applied to the study of international relations and comparative politics, which are increasingly addressing issues in public policy. Within the first part, the common features of terrorism financing linked to the non-profit sector are identified. The great powers the United States and the European Union remain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. Staying silent on an issue sends signals to policymakers about issue saliency and industry support.
This article summarises the outcome of the summit and looks at the challenges that still remain. In spite of favorable circumstances, the Directive's opponents watered down the Commission's proposal during the course of the negotiations. For example, when will the great powers agree to coordinate their regulatory standards? Powerful states can and will engage in forum-shopping within a complex of international regimes. In this discussion, he outlines the ways that initial puzzle led to a career driven by seeking to understand the transformational impact of technology at the global level and on the discipline of International Relations. The result is a book that challenges popular notions of globalization by placing the power and interests of governments back into the centre stage of debate. We demonstrate that capital mobility increases the constraints on the taxation of income from capital only when investors expect future taxes to rise. It further describes the scope and effects of the different mechanisms used to achieve regulatory convergence, on both substantive and procedural matters.
The preferences of great powers, however, are hardly either internally consistent or always convergent. Polling data reveals that U. Second, in terms of costs, these referendums have negative ramifications for other countries, because they destroy existing gains from cooperation, but also carries political contagion risks that can put the long-run viability of the entire international institutions at risk. Drezner takes a fresh look at the role of the powerful states in governing the world economy. Finally, our results suggest evidence of the benefits of business group affiliation in reducing the distress likelihood of member firms during the East Asian financial crisis. Adjustment costs are a function of the ability of the affected domestic actors to use exit rather than voice in reacting to the impact of regulatory coordination. Critical globalization studies may be employed to identify diverse tendencies in world order, parts of a contradictory whole that coexist, with different logics colliding with one another.
The goals are often ambiguous. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies. Utilizing the case of climate finance in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, we find that while a variety of norms underpinning transparency are recognized within the governance architecture, their translation into accountability mechanisms has been weak, and information disclosed by countries is often opaque. To examine the diverse faces the regulatory state has adopted along its globalization path in depth, our variables are grouped into four blocs: regulatory responsibilities, managerial autonomy, political independence, and public accountability. That is how the theory will be developed here. This article examines the contingent nature of financial industry lobbying power in the context of the policy formation stage of six European Commission regulatory proposals.
With the description of these standards, which seem to stand on opposite sides of a continuum, we examine why China and New Zealand decided to forego the standards under which they had negotiated previous agreements in order to find a middle ground. This does not mean everyone follows willingly, as Drezner shows with the example of largely successful U. My dissertation draws on three years of data collection in Europe and the United States, including the analysis of a number of publicly available primary sources, such as minutes of international meetings, protocols of parliamentary committees and debates, and communications of government officials. Although there are many dimensions of economic regulation, this definition presumes that standards are the primary operationalization through which political authorities establish the global rules of the game. They meticulously implement different requirements by developing private compliance standards and risk assessments that are technically sophisticated and designed to earn regulatory kudos; they do not simply follow what is required. Has globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? There is an increased concern with dynamics, competitiveness, and innovation which appear to be important elements in generating the increased interest in the evolutionary model of economic behavior. Partly as a response to these problems, globalization studies has evolved and may be tentatively delimited by a distinct set of characteristics.
The great powers--the United States and the European Union--remain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. The paper contributes to debates on institutional change as well as to those on rising powers and the constraints they face in their attempts to transform growing wealth into military strength. Under these conditions banks and investors may restrict access to capital in non-compliant states and incentivize increased compliance. Has globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? Testing this revisionist model of global regulatory governance on an unusually wide variety of cases, including the Internet, finance, genetically modified organisms, and intellectual property rights, Drezner shows why there is such disparity in the strength of international regulations. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. To begin with, this perspective suggests that states of greater structural power will enjoy the greatest bargaining success, since they can use their superior resources to coax and cajole weaker parties to submission Drezner 2007. Beyond the study of global political economy, the topic of regulatory coordination raises theoretical questions about global governance that affect a wide variety of debates among international relations theorists.
The first wave of scholarship—and virtually all of the popular literature on the subject—emphasized the primacy of structural forces over the agency of actors. This essay reviews the arguments and evidence for how globalization affects the convergence of regulatory policies, in particular the setting of labor and environmental standards. As Peter Haas points out: It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of many of these conferences, in part because of weaknesses and gaps in our ability to monitor progress in achieving conference goals. Since states wish to create or maintain competitive banking institutions, they have often deregulated in order to provide banks with a cost advantage in the international marketplace. As such, we depart from the view that a single dimension does capture the actual diversity of institutional forms regulatory agencies may exhibit. From a critical perspective, precisely what kind of knowledge about globalization is meaningful? This paper examines how to measure one major change that has occurred in recent decades: the worldwide proliferation of public agencies with regulatory tasks. As Drezner shows, state size still matters.